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JONATHAN S. MASUR†
REGULATING PATENTS
Imagine the following scenario: In 1972, instead of creating
the Environmental Protection Agency,1 Congress passes the
Environmental Pollution Act, which states that “no person shall be
permitted to emit any pollutant in a manner that unreasonably
endangers human health” and provides for civil penalties and
injunctive relief against violators. After the statute takes effect, eager
plaintiffs begin filing cases against industries that they believe are
breaking the law. The courts are then faced with the task of sorting
out which suits are meritorious and which are not, a process that
naturally involves interpreting what it means for a pollutant to
“unreasonably” endanger human health.
Immediately, of course, the courts run into significant
difficulties. A factory that is emitting significant amounts of mercury
directly into a source of drinking water is obviously in violation, but
what about a factory that emits smaller amounts of mercury into the
ocean? What about a factory that emits substantial quantities of
carbon monoxide, a known carcinogen, but has installed cutting-edge
technology to mitigate these emissions as much as possible? Or
consider a third factory that produces water bottles made with BPA, a
chemical that may (or may not) cause adverse health effects in
humans.2 This factory could cease using BPA in its manufacturing
processes but that would mean inferior bottles, perhaps without any
environmental benefit.
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1
To be precise, President Nixon formed the EPA by reorganizing a number of
different sub-agencies that Congress had created. See note 113.
2
See Adam Hinterthuer, Just How Harmful Are Bisphenol A Plastics?, Scientific
American
(Aug
26,
2008),
online
at
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=just-how-harmful-are-bisphenola-plastics (visited Nov 11, 2010).
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Not surprisingly, courts find themselves poorly equipped to
evaluate the relevant scientific and economic questions. They cannot
determine consistently or reliably how harmful a particular pollutant
really is, and in what doses. They struggle with the inevitable
economic tradeoffs involved in banning environmental pollutants. If
restricting the emission of a chemical will save one life but lead to the
loss of 10,000 jobs, does that chemical pose an “unreasonable” threat
to human health? The courts have no workable metric for deciding.
The result is a patchwork of environmental prohibitions that may not
do much to protect humans or the environment, and may involve
counter-productive and costly economic tradeoffs that few people
would be willing to accept.
The institutional arrangement described in this scenario will
likely strike most readers as inadvisable. It makes little sense to
entrust generalist judges with a task as technically complicated as
determining which environmental emissions are dangerous, and at
what economic cost they should be regulated. The courts have limited
technical expertise and little institutional ability to conduct the
necessary studies and analyses. If it is necessary to regulate
environmental pollutants, better to delegate regulatory authority to the
Environmental Protection Agency than the courts. Congress has
indeed taken this approach.
As ill-conceived as judge-driven environmental policy might
seem, a similar arrangement prevails in the equally technocratic field
of patent law. The Patent Act is written in broad terms, permitting
patents on any “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter.” Congress has not significantly amended the
Patent Act since 1952, and the Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”)
has never had substantive rulemaking authority.3 Courts, therefore,
have taken center stage. In particular, the Federal Circuit has assumed
near-total authority over patent policy and doctrine, which is a position
held by no other appellate court over any area of law. The result has
not been felicitous. The Federal Circuit has been roundly criticized for
promulgating overly formalistic doctrines that ignore pragmatic
considerations; tolerating uncertainty and confusion on key points of
law; enhancing the power of patent holders to the point of diminishing
3

See Clarissa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U Pa
L Rev 1965, 1968 (2009); Animal Legal Defense Fund v Quigg, 932 F2d 920, 930
(Fed Cir 1991) (interpreting the Patent and Trademark Office’s rule-making
authority as extending only to the procedures used in the course of examination).
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innovation; and failing to distinguish technological fields in which
patents are necessary from those in which they are not.4
In recent years, the Supreme Court has intervened to address
some of the Federal Circuit’s more glaring faults. Since 2005, the
Court has decided seven patent cases5—a startling number given the
Court’s traditional reluctance to involve itself in patent matters.6 The
most recent and most important of these forays came during the
October 2009 Term, in Bilski v. Kappos.7 The case posed the question
whether inventors could patent “business methods” (that is, processes
for running a business that do not necessarily involve any physical
product) or other similarly intangible processes. Bilski held potentially
enormous economic significance. Thousands of patents on business
methods and other intangible processes are granted each year, even
though the Supreme Court had never before passed on their validity.
Moreover, many scholars now believe that these types of patents are
counterproductive: By increasing transaction costs and creating
anticommons problems, they might well discourage innovation more
than they encourage it.8 Many commentators thus hoped that the
Court would use Bilski to limit the sorts of intangible processes that
can be patented.
As it turned out, the Supreme Court did no such thing. Rather,
Bilski merely reaffirmed the well-known principle that “abstract ideas”
cannot be patented, without providing guidance on whether business
4

See generally Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, The Patent Crisis and How the
Courts Can Solve It 21 (Chicago 2009); James Bessen and Michael J. Meurer,
Patent Failure (Princeton 2008); Adam B. Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its
Discontents: How Our Broken Patent System Is Endangering Innovation and
Progress, and What To Do About It (Princeton 2004).
5
See Bilski v Kappos, 130 S Ct 3218, 3225 (2010); Quanta Computer, Inc v LG
Electronics, Inc, 553 US 617, 625 (2008); Microsoft Corp v AT&T Corp, 550 US
437, 447 (2007); KSR Intern Co v Teleflex Inc, 550 US 398, 407 (2007);
MedImmune, Inc v Genentech, Inc, 549 US 118, 122 (2007); eBay Inc v
MercExchange, LLC, 547 US 388, 391 (2006); Merck KGaA v Integra Lifesciences
I, Ltd, 545 US 193, 202 (2005). The Court has also granted certiorari in three more
patent cases for the 2010 Term. See Microsoft Corp v. i4i Limited Partnership, et al,
2010 WL 3392402 (2010); Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc, 131 S Ct 501 (2010); Global-Tech
Appliances, Inc v. SEB S.A., 131 S Ct 458 (2010).
6
See John M. Golden, The Supreme Court As “Prime Percolator,” 56 UCLA L Rev
657, 658 (2009) (“[T]he Supreme Court has, in the past six years, asserted its
dominion over patent law with frequency and force.”).
7
130 S Ct 3218 (2010).
8
See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 31 (cited in note 4).
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methods and software algorithms are abstract ideas, or even explaining
how to define abstract ideas in the first instance.9 It is easy to view
this outcome as a lost opportunity for the Court to correct the Federal
Circuit’s excesses.
But it is worth pausing to consider more thoroughly what,
precisely, the Supreme Court could or should have done. Whether to
allow patents on business methods is a highly complex economic
question, one that requires balancing the incentives for innovation
provided by patents against the costs that monopoly rights impose
upon innovators and market entrants. These issues are layered upon
the technological complexity that surrounds patent law. To make
sensible judgments, courts must first understand the technology and
markets involved, and then parse the economic details.
These are tasks to which courts have never been well-suited.
Indeed, the courts themselves have implicitly recognized this fact—
including prominently in Bilski. There, the Court acknowledged that
questions of patentability should be resolved with reference to
economics, with patents granted only where they will promote, rather
than hinder, innovation.10 Yet the majority did not attempt any such
analysis. Instead the justices fell back on traditional tools of statutory
interpretation: text, doctrine, and history.
Perhaps likewise
recognizing their own limitations, the judges on the Federal Circuit
have appeared equally unwilling to engage the key economic issues at
anything other than a doctrinal level, in Bilski or elsewhere.
These are not earthshaking revelations. In areas of regulation
ranging from securities, to pharmaceutical drugs, to transportation, to
the environment, policymakers have turned instead to expert
administrative agencies, perhaps because they understood the
institutional deficiencies of courts This general trend towards agency
policymaking in technical fields comes with good reason. Absent
input from an agency or the legislature, the federal courts have
repeatedly proved inadequate to the task of setting sound patent
policy. Yet the institutional design for patent law remains an outlier.
Patent law is a highly technically complex regulatory field controlled
entirely by the courts. Similarly, the PTO is one of the only federal
administrative agencies to lack any semblance of substantive rulemaking authority.
9

See Bilski, 130 S Ct at 3225.
See id at 3228–29.
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The time has come to consider reorienting patent law’s
institutional arrangements to bring them more into line with the rest of
the administrative state. And the most straightforward means of
achieving this would be for Congress to endow the PTO with
substantive rule-making authority.
Such a change could produce significant benefits for patent
law. A properly empowered PTO could bring expertise and
institutional resources to bear on complex questions of patent policy to
a degree unthinkable within the federal courts. In addition, the patent
office currently produces enormous quantities of useful information
but has no reliable mechanism for transmitting that information to the
Federal Circuit, in part because the Federal Circuit does not have the
proper incentives to accept and utilize that information. Substantive
rule-making power would allow the PTO to utilize its substantial
informational resources in crafting intelligent patent policy, and would
permit the agency to design rules that respond to particular
technological developments in specific fields. Where Federal Circuit
hegemony has failed to generate sensible patent policy, intervention by
the PTO may yet succeed.
My argument is comparative, first and foremost. It may be that
patent questions should be decided with respect to moral or
deontological considerations, not economic ones. However, modern
theories of patent law center almost entirely around economic
considerations.11 Economics plays as large a role in contemporary
understandings of the shape and scope of patent law as it does in
nearly any other field. Accordingly, I simply adopt an economic
perspective here while recognizing that some observers may favor a
different approach. Similarly, I do not argue that all or even most
areas of regulation should be entrusted to agencies rather than courts.
Rather, the point is that the case for agency authority is at least as
strong for patent law as it is in environmental law, securities law, food
and drug law, or any other major area of regulation.12 Agencies have
long held primary substantive rule-making authority in those fields
and many others. Unless one believes that the administrative state

11

See, for example, Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 66 (cited in note 4) (“It is
true that there have been a few theories of patent law based in moral right, reward, or
distributive justice, but to be blunt they are hard to take seriously as explanations for
the actual scope of patent law.”).
12
See Part II.F.
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should be dismantled wholesale, there is no compelling reason to resist
granting substantive rule-making authority to the PTO.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the Bilski
decision and explains how it exposes courts’ fundamental inability to
solve the technically complex problems that surround patent law. Part
II explores the reasons behind the courts’ historical dominance of
patent law in contrast to the power of agencies in other fields, and
concludes that it is little more than a historical accident. Part III lays
out the affirmative case for granting substantive rule-making authority
to the PTO and addresses possible objections to that new institutional
arrangement. There is no reason, modern or historical, for allowing
the judiciary to continue as the sole steward of patent law and policy.
I. BILSKI AND THE FAILURE OF THE COURTS
At the most basic level, the objective of the patentability
doctrines—those legal rules that govern which inventions can be
patented and which cannot—is to allow patents on inventions that
would not otherwise be created (or disseminated) without the incentive
provided by a monopoly right.13 It is for this reason that an invention
must be novel14 and non-obvious15 in order to be patentable. It is not
necessary to provide inventors with incentives to create or disclose an
invention that is already in the public domain.16
In addition to these limitations, patent law also imposes the
baseline requirement that an invention comprise “patentable subject
matter.” That is, the invention must be a “process, machine,
13

See Robert Patrick Merges and John Fitzgerald Duffy, Patent Law and Policy:
Cases and Materials 253–256 (LexisNexis 3d ed 2007) (describing the incentive
systems meant to drive the patent law); Donald S. Chisum et al, Principles of Patent
Law 6 (West 1998). There are other potential objectives behind the rules governing
patentability, including reducing transaction costs for follow-on inventors, see
Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 700 (1998), avoiding rentdissipating races, see Mark F. Grady and Jay I. Alexander, Patent Races and Rent
Dissipation, 78 Va L Rev 305, 317 (1992), and avoiding duplicative research, see
generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J L
& Econ 265 (1977). I do not pause to dwell on these additional goals because they
are essentially aligned with the objective of dynamic efficiency: the production of
the greatest amount of innovation at the lowest economic cost.
14
35 USC § 102.
15
35 USC § 103.
16
See Chisum, Principles of Patent Law at 335 (cited in note 13).
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manufacture, or composition of matter.”17 Courts and commentators
have understood this language to mean that there are some types of
inventions (and perhaps even some fields of endeavor) that cannot be
patented even if they are novel and non-obvious.18
What could be the purpose of barring patents on certain types
of inventions, even if they are novel and not obvious? If there is a
basis for doing so, it must be that certain types of patents will be more
harmful than beneficial—that the inefficiencies caused by allowing
patents on these inventions will exceed the benefits of providing
additional inducement for their development.19 Indeed, it is now clear
that patents function very differently in different industries.20 In some
industries they are almost certainly essential to incentivizing
innovation; in others they likely inhibit research and development
more than they promote it.21
The reasons are multiple. In some industries where up-front
innovation costs are high but copying costs are low, firms would lack
the proper incentives to innovate without the ability to acquire
patents.22 For instance, no pharmaceutical company will attempt to
bring a drug to market without a patent for fear that a generic
competitor will simply appropriate the idea.23 On the other hand, in
other industries first-mover advantage and other non-patent business
strategies can be enough to encourage firms to proceed with research
and development, even where patent protection is uncertain.24 In these
industries, competition is the best catalyst of invention. The software,
computer, and semiconductor industries appear to fit this mold.25
17

35 USC § 101.
See Michael Abramowicz and John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market
Experimentation, 83 NYU L Rev 337, 344 (2008).
19
See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 31 (cited in note 4).
20
See id at 27–40.
21
See id at 40.
22
See, for example, Burk & Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 66–68 (cited in note 4);
Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Patent Law, 75 Texas L Rev
989, 994–95 (1997); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science:
Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U Chi L Rev 1017, 1024–28 (1989).
23
See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 143–44 (cited in note 4).
24
See, for example, Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral
Economics for the Common Good, 16 Geo Mason L Rev 141, 145–46 (2008)
(“Many non-patent factors drive innovation and can in some instances make patents
irrelevant. These include the desire for a first-mover advantage . . . .”); Burk and
Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 72–73 (cited in note 4).
25
See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 82–85 (cited in note 4).
18
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At the same time, the proliferation of patents almost certainly
threatens greater economic harm in some industries than in others.26
For instance, some industries are characterized by patent thickets27 and
anticommons problems.28 Firms that wish to innovate must negotiate
licenses on large numbers of extant patents and consequently face high
transaction costs.29 The software and semiconductor industries are
widely believed to suffer from these problems.30 Conversely, the
biotechnology industry may be much less susceptible to growth in
transaction costs, as each pharmaceutical compound is typically
covered by only one patent.31 Under these circumstances, a sensible
patent policy would prohibit, or at least limit, patents within certain
technological fields while allowing them in others.
A. JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF PATENT POLICY

It was within this context that Bilski reached the Supreme
Court. The case concerned a patent on a method for hedging risk in
the movement of commodities prices, which is a prototypical method
for doing business. Over the past several decades, business methods,32

26

See Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation (Stanford
Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 397 Sept 2010), online at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1670197 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
27
“Patent thickets” arise in industries in which multiple overlapping patents cover a
single invention. See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 77–78 (cited in note 4).
For instance, there might be hundreds of patents that read on a single integrated
circuit design, many of them on the same parts of the circuit.
28
A patent anticommons is a situation in which multiple patents cover sequential
parts of an invention. See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 75–77 (cited in
note 4). For instance, there might be a patent on a purified DNA sequence, a patent
on the protein that this DNA sequence codes for, a patent on a process for artificially
manufacturing this protein, a patent on a pharmaceutical compound incorporating
this protein, and a patent on a means for delivering this compound to a patient (such
as a pill). A pharmaceutical company that wished to manufacture this pill would be
forced to license all of these patents. The threat of an anticommons is the
explanation usually offered for the prohibition on patenting abstract ideas. See
Diamond v Diehr, 450 US 175, 185 (1981).
29
See Heller and Eisenberg, 280 Science at 700 (cited in note 13).
30
See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 86–92 (cited in note 4).
31
See Mark A. Lemley, Ten Things to Do About Patent Holdup of Standards (and
One Not to), 48 BC L Rev 148, 149 (2007).
32
See State Street Bank v Signature Financial Group, 149 F3d 1368, 1375 (Fed Cir
1998).
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tax methods,33 software algorithms,34 and other intangible processes
have been patented in increasing numbers.35 Yet the Court had never
before considered whether these types of inventions were patentable.
Meanwhile, some scholars have suggested that patents in many of
these fields were unnecessary, or even counterproductive. Many
observers believed that the Supreme Court agreed and would impose
significant limits on patents in these fields.36
In Bilski, the Court acknowledged the role that subject matter
limitations should play in restricting patenting where it might be
harmful. As Justice Kennedy explained for the Court, “[i]f a high
enough bar is not set . . . patent examiners and courts could be flooded
with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor and dynamic
change.”37 For all intents and purposes, however, the Court stopped
there. It resisted calls for categorical limitations on patents for
business methods and similar inventions,38 and it refused to provide
guidance on how patent law should “strik[e] the balance between
protecting inventors and not granting monopolies over procedures that
others would discover . . . .”39 The Court’s only instructions for the
rest of us were a generic reaffirmation that abstract ideas cannot be
patented and a declaration that Bernard Bilski’s particular patent was
invalid on that ground. The Court’s opinion did not specify any
helpful legal standard to employ when determining whether an
invention constitutes an abstract idea.40

33

See for example Transamerica Life Ins Co v. Lincoln Nat Life Ins Co, 597 F Supp
2d 897 (ND Iowa 2009).
34
See generally In re Beauregard, 53 F3d 1583 (Fed Cir 1995) (allowing software
patent); In re Alappat, 33 F3d 1526, 1544 (Fed Cir 1994) (en banc) (same).
35
See Justin M. Lee, The Board Bites Back: Bilski and the B.P.A.I., 24 Berkeley
Tech L J 49, 49 (2009) (describing the “period of considerable expansion in subjectmatter eligibility”).
36
See, for example, Joe Mullin, Supreme Skepticism Over Bilski Claims Puts
Method Patents on Shaky Ground, The AmLaw Daily (Nov 9, 2009), online at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2009/11/bilski.html (visited Dec 29,
2010); Tony Mauro, Bilski Case Provokes Patent Skepticism from Justices, The
BLT: The Blog of Legal Times (Nov 9, 2009), online at
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/11/bilski-case-provokes-patent-skepticismfrom-justices.html (visited Dec 29, 2010).
37
Bilski, 130 S Ct at 3229.
38
See id at 3227.
39
Id at 3229.
40
See id at 3226–27.
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Justice Stevens’ concurrence fared slightly better.
The
majority of the concurrence is a lengthy analysis of text, precedent,
and history—the standard tools of statutory interpretation.41 However,
at the end of his opinion Justice Stevens explained that patents should
be granted only when “a patent monopoly is necessary to motivate the
invention” and attempted to determine whether business methods
qualify under that standard.42 After canvassing some of the scholarly
literature on business method patents, Stevens concluded that they did
not.43
This is an improvement on the majority, but it demonstrates the
limitations of judicial analysis. Stevens cites many leading patent
scholars,44 but he does not so much as mention any of the scholars
who support business method patents.45 The concurrence does not
grapple with the competing positions; the case against business
methods is stated in conclusory fashion.46 Accordingly, it is difficult
to have much confidence in Justice Stevens’ analysis, even if one were
inclined to credit the Supreme Court for an approach that could not
garner five votes.47
1. Patent economics in the courts. To some, the Court’s
general unwillingness to analyze came as a disappointment. But it is
easy to understand the Supreme Court’s reticence. Suppose that the
Court was willing to consider the possibility that patents should not be
allowed in certain technological fields, or at least that the bar to them
41

See id at 3231–52 (Stevens concurring in the judgment).
Id at 3253 (Stevens concurring in the judgment) (quotation marks omitted).
43
See id at 3252–56.
44
See id.
45
See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property?
A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 Stan L Rev 455, 484
(2010); Brief of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Bilski v. Kappos, No 08-964, at *15–*23 (filed Aug 6, 2009) (available on Westlaw
at 2009 WL 2481328) (written by Richard A. Epstein and F. Scott Kieff).
46
Notably, the only concession Justice Stevens makes to countervailing argument is
one sentence buried in a footnote: “Concededly, there may some methods of doing
business that do not confer sufficient first-mover advantages.” Bilski, 130 S Ct at
3254 n 51 (Stevens concurring in the judgment), citing Michael Abramowicz and
John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 NYU L Rev
337, 340–42 (2008).
47
I mean to take no position on the underlying question of whether business methods
should be patentable. But I hasten to add that if I were forced to choose a side I
would most likely agree with Justice Stevens. My criticism of his analysis has
nothing to do with my view of his ultimate conclusion.
42
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should be raised substantially. How was the Court to judge whether it
should reduce patenting of business methods, or tax strategies, or
software, or any number of other possible fields of endeavor? These
are complicated economic questions with difficult empirical
dimensions, precisely the type of questions that courts are not well
positioned to answer. Courts have no resources to conduct economic
studies and no staff qualified to interpret them.48 Typically, a court is
limited to perusing the amicus briefs filed by outside parties, most of
whom have a vested interest in the outcome of the case.49 These are
not reliable, neutral sources of information, much less comprehensive
examinations of such complicated issues. Nor do courts have the
capacity to compare and evaluate competing technical arguments,
which the two sides to an issue will inevitably provide.50 The
shortcomings of even the Bilski concurrence lay bare these limitations.
Not surprisingly, then, evidence indicates that the Federal Circuit is
not significantly influenced by amicus briefs.51 This may very well be
for the best.
This issue is not limited to business method patents. For
instance, a district court recently declared that isolated and purified
gene sequences are unpatentable as “products of nature.”52 This
would be a momentous ruling were it to stand. Molecular genetics is a
multi-billion dollar industry in the United States alone, and many
firms have business models dependent largely on obtaining patents on
gene sequences. Eliminating gene patents might dampen important
innovation. On the other hand, doing so might reduce the transaction
costs involved in developing pharmaceuticals and gene therapies.53
Not surprisingly, the district court opinion mentioned none of these
48

See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures 120 Yale L J 2, 20–25 (2010).
In some cases a court could retain a special master to evaluate the economic issues
presented by a particular case. This might well be an improvement on typical
judicial decision-making. At the limit, however, it reduces to ad hoc expert
decision-making—a less desirable version of typical agency action. I discuss this
point further below.
50
See Richard Posner, The Law and Economics of the Economic Expert Witness, 13
J Econ Persp 91, 96 (1999).
51
See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Amicus Briefs: What the Courts’ Friends Can Teach
Us About the Patent System, U Cal Irvine L Rev (forthcoming) (manuscript at 25–
28) (finding that amicus briefs exert very little influence on the Federal Circuit),
online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1608111 (visited Oct 3, 2010).
52
See Association for Molecular Pathology v US Patent and Trademark Office, 702
F Supp 2d 181, 222 (SDNY 2010).
53
See Heller and Eisenberg, 280 Science at 700 (cited in note 13).
49
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possible economic consequences. Instead the judge presented a
straightforward doctrinal analysis of whether “purification” was
enough to transform a natural product into a patentable invention.54
The result of Bilski is to return the issue to the Federal Circuit
and allow that body to develop the law further. But it is hard to
imagine that court faring much better. With the same lack of
resources and absence of staff expertise, the Federal Circuit is no
better equipped to make difficult economic judgments than the
Supreme Court. The Circuit decides a large number of patent cases
every year, but those cases only represent a small fraction of the
economic activity involving patents in any given industry. While any
court will struggle with complex economic issues, it is particularly
difficult for a court to ascertain the answer to questions such as
whether patents are harmful or beneficial within a given field. The
problem is that the vast majority of the relevant economic action takes
place outside of the courtroom. Patents will be harmful where they
create thickets or anticommons and raise transaction costs for new
innovators;55 they will be beneficial where they incentivize invention
that would not otherwise occur. Courts cannot observe either activity.
It is certainly not news that courts struggle with difficult
economic questions. Scholars have recognized this issue most
prominently within the field of antitrust—the other area of federal law
in which judges are the primary policymakers56 Yet this criticism has
largely been confined to antitrust law. The likely explanation is that
the Sherman Antitrust Act explicitly calls for an economic judgment:
any contract “in restraint of trade” is illegal.57 Patent law, by contrast,
embeds its economic judgments within doctrine. An invention is only
patentable if it is novel, nonobvious, and involves a “process, machine,
54

See Association for Molecular Pathology, 702 F Supp 2d at 226–27.
See Ian Ayres and Paul Klempere, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without
Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and NonInjunctive Remedies, 97 Mich L Rev 985, 1018–20 (1999); Heller and Eisenberg,
280 Science at 698–99 (cited in note 13).
56
See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 249 (Aspen 7th ed 2007); Michael
R. Baye and Joshua D. Wright, Is Antitrust Too Complicated for Generalist Judges?,
J
L
and
Econ
(forthcoming
2010),
online
at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1319888 (visited Nov 7, 2010); William Kovacic
and Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking (U of
Cal–Berkeley, Center for Competition Policy Working Paper No. CPC99-09,
October 1999), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=506284.
57
15 USC § 1.
55
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manufacture, or composition of matter,” and none of these doctrinal
elements overtly demands an economic analysis. Patent judges have
thus clung tenaciously to the legal language of patent law, refusing to
engage directly with the economic issues at hand.
This arrangement would be suitable if there were reason to
believe that the Patent Act already incorporated sound economic
judgment on the part of Congress. While such a claim might have
been sustainable fifty years ago, it no longer appears plausible. The
Patent Act was last amended in 1952, a time that precedes almost all
business method, software, and tax patents, and even the modern
computer and semiconductor industries.58 These industries may very
well have different market structures than other major areas of
patenting such as machinery and pharmaceuticals, and those different
market structures may dictate divergent reactions to the availability of
patents. If patents diminish innovation and social welfare in some of
these fields more than they increase it, as critics of expansive patent
rights maintain, then the patent system ought to adjust accordingly. It
makes no sense to pretend that Congress somehow managed to embed
the proper rules into the Act’s terse language in 1952 (and before), and
that the courts need merely divine Congress’s intent. If courts are not
well equipped to make economic judgments, there is no reason to
believe that decades-old verbal formulations provide the answers.
2. The particular problems with subject matter distinctions.
These problems are endemic to any situation involving complex
empirical questions. But the difficulties the Supreme Court would
have in formulating a sensible doctrine of patentable subject matter
run even deeper. Suppose that the Court wished to wall off business
methods as unpatentable. Consider the various verbal formulations
that the Court might have adopted. The Federal Circuit’s original test
asked whether an invention created a “useful, concrete, and tangible
result.”59 This is far too capacious. Nearly any type of business
method—a method of sale, a means of organizing a business, or a
strategy for structuring taxable income—creates a tangible result of
one type or another, if only indirectly, simply by altering the way in
which people exchange goods or services.
In Bilski, the Federal Circuit settled on what is known as the
“machine-or-transformation test”: an invention is patentable if it
58
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involves a machine or transforms matter.60 But this test might itself be
dramatically under- or over-inclusive, depending upon how
capaciously it is understood. The principal issue is whether a generalpurpose computer, appended to a claim, would constitute a machine
for purposes of the test. If it did not, the test would likely exclude a
host of inventions not commonly thought of as business methods,
including software. This may be undesirable. And if the machine-ortransformation test did permit the patenting of abstract process claims
to which a general-purpose computer had been attached, it would
likely have little or no force. A large proportion of modern business
methods require a computer to run. (Consider Amazon.com’s
archetypal “one-click” patent.61) Requiring a computer as an element
would not greatly limit the scope of patent claims.
Finally, the Court could have declared as a matter of doctrine
that “business methods cannot be patented.” But precisely defining
“business method” is not a trivial exercise.
After all, most
inventions—from farm machinery to pharmaceuticals to industrial
processes—are “methods of running a business” in the most general
sense. Business methods are defined most prominently by what they
are not, namely tangible objects. Similar problems of definition will
plague attempts to flesh out the Supreme Court’s prohibition on
“abstract ideas” as well, especially considering that the Court rejected
the machine-and-transformation test as the sole guide for determining
whether a patent was merely an abstract idea.62
The courts could commence the laborious process of drawing a
boundary around the concept of business methods, but they would face
a patent bar working to find new ways to draft patents to evade the
courts’ rules. The result would be a flood of litigation on the issue and
a substantial degree of uncertainty regarding what is patentable.
While the Federal Circuit is in the process of deciding which
inventions are business methods and which are not, the PTO might
well be making its own errors of under- and over-inclusion—issuing
patents that are later understood to be invalid, or refusing to grant
patents that it should. These errors create significant social costs.63
60
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Eventually, the courts likely would settle upon a workable
understanding of business methods and the number of difficult cases
would diminish. Yet this would only return to the earlier problem: in
the course of finding a common law solution to the question of what
constitutes a business method patent, there is no reason to believe that
the Federal Circuit would have the ability or the inclination to evaluate
the difficult economic issues involved. Indeed, there is evidence that
the Federal Circuit relies even more heavily on doctrine and is even
more reticent than the Supreme Court to address patent questions in
economic terms.64
B. OTHER PATENT DOCTRINES

Bilski lays bare the courts’ ultimate unsuitability in deciding
the complex economic questions that underlie patent law. But the
issue of patentable subject matter is hardly the only area in which the
courts’ shortcomings are manifest. In a number of areas, courts
struggle badly with the tradeoff between allowing too few patents and
too many.
There are more optimistic views. In their recent book, The
Patent Crisis and How the Courts Can Solve It, Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley offer the most sustained and cogent defense to date of the role
of courts in managing the patent system. Burk and Lemley advance
and defend the idea, described earlier, that patents function differently
across industries. Certain industries will benefit from broader patents
and others from narrower ones; some from compulsory licensing and
others from stronger patent remedies; some from higher barriers to
patenting (utility, nonobviousness, or written description65) and others
from lower. Burk and Lemley argue that courts already possess the
tools to fine-tune the rules governing patents in various industries.
They point to a variety of doctrines—“patent levers”—that courts can
employ to adjust the power or scope of patents from industry to
industry, and they argue that the federal courts have in effect already
created different patent rules for different types of technology.66
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Although Burk and Lemley’s argument is nuanced and
thorough, and they leave little doubt that these patent levers exist,67
their analysis does not indicate that courts are using them properly in
most circumstances. To the contrary, Burk and Lemley describe
industry after industry in which the Federal Circuit has failed to select
what the authors believe to be the proper rule, leading to patents that
may do more harm than good.68 After all, their book is titled The
Patent Crisis. They obviously agree with the broad consensus that the
patent system is functioning very poorly.69
Burk and Lemley are also forthright in admitting that scholars
may disagree about the rules that should govern each of these
industries.70 They characterize the outstanding questions as difficult
economic issues that remain to be resolved by experts, and quite
rightly so.71 Yet there is no reason to believe—and every reason to
doubt—that courts could play that expert role. A number of recent
cases have grappled with the doctrines of utility and non-obviousness
in ways that could significantly alter the numbers and timing of patent
grants.72 But courts deciding those cases have little idea whether they
are balancing properly between these competing concerns. In general,
they hardly appear to be trying. The cases are largely bereft of any
indication that economic concerns played a role in the judges’
decision-making; their decisions are driven by text, precedent, and
other traditional legal tools.
This sketch of some of the economic questions that courts have
left unanswered does not even touch upon the technical and scientific
issues that judges are asked to decide in the course of nearly every
patent case, issues that they are equally poorly prepared to handle. In
the regular course of litigation, generalist judges must determine
67
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whether a patent describes a technically complex invention sufficiently
well that a person skilled in the relevant technology could recreate it,
or whether an invention is obvious in light of two or more prior
inventions in related fields. It is almost to state the obvious to observe
that untrained judges cannot perform these tasks well. Even the
Federal Circuit is little better off: of the twelve active judges on the
court, only five of them had practiced or taught patent law before
joining the court, only six have even undergraduate degrees in
technical fields, and none has an advanced degree in economics.73 It is
thus puzzling that the Federal Circuit has managed to acquire a
reputation as an expert court.
Of course, it is possible that even after sustained examination
some of these patent questions will not yield economic answers. The
economics of innovation are hardly straightforward. But if any
institutional actor is capable of providing such answers, it is not likely
to be the federal courts.
C. OBJECTIONS AND CAVEATS

1. The judicial role. Some scholars and judges—indeed, many
members of the current Supreme Court—might sidestep the foregoing
critique on the ground that it misunderstands the judicial role. On one
view, deciding which inventions represent “patentable subject matter”
simply involves interpreting section 101 of the Patent Act. Judges, on
this account, are meant to decide questions of statutory interpretation
with reference only to traditional legal materials (such as statutory
text, structure, judicial precedent, and legislative history), and not
economic theory or empirics.74 Accordingly, this story goes, a critique
of judges as incapable of addressing such complex economic or
technical issues misses the mark.
73
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This objection might strike many as compelling. It may be
precisely because courts are ill-equipped to delve into complicated
economic matters that they are best advised to adhere closely to
traditional legal materials when interpreting statutes. This is only a
possibility; a full theory of statutory interpretation is well beyond the
scope of this Article. Regardless of the proper theory, however, the
point is the same: there is no reason to have a patent system that does
not structure incentives to promote innovation. If courts, as a matter
of institutional role, should not be taking such considerations into
account, then responsibility for setting baseline patent rules should be
transferred to an institution that can address such questions.
2. The uniqueness of patent law? If the foregoing argument
regarding the comparative disadvantage of courts is correct, it raises a
separate issue: why should it apply only to patent law? Many if not all
common-law doctrines—such as the judge-made elements of contract
and tort law—produce significant economic consequences. Courts
may be unable to address competently the economic issues presented
by, for instance, the choice between negligence and strict liability in
tort, or various treatments of liquidated damages clauses in contract.
Early law and economics scholarship maintained that the common law
would naturally evolve toward efficient rules,75 but that theory remains
unsupported.76
Some readers might recoil against any argument suggesting
that classic common-law fields are better handled by institutions other
than courts. Even if that reaction turns out to be correct, however, it
would not necessarily defeat the argument presented here. There are
several reasons to believe that judges are especially ill-suited to setting
the rules of patent law.
First of all, the existing rules of patent law have been roundly
criticized, and to a degree currently unequalled within the common
law.77 If judges appear to be performing adequately, there seems little
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reason to re-allocate responsibilities. The indictment of judges as
stewards of the patent law is driven by the fact that patent law seems
to have strayed far from its optimal course.
Second, the economic questions underlying patent law may
imply be more difficult for judges than those involved in typical
common law rules. According to Richard Posner, “Many common
law doctrines are economically sensible but not economically subtle . .
. . Their articulation in economic terms is beyond the capacity of most
judges and lawyers, but their intuition is not.”78 (Posner contrasts
common law doctrines with antitrust law, which he argues has been
handled inadequately by judges.79) In addition, patent law requires
navigating an additional layer of technical complexity above and
beyond the selection of an economically efficient rule. Even if it is
equally difficult for a court to judge the economic consequences of
allowing patents on gene sequences and deciding tort liability on a
negligence standard, a court must attempt the former while
simultaneously grappling with the technical specifics of gene
sequences and the question of how they are different from other types
of biotechnology.80
Another possible reason lies with the objectives embodied in
these areas of law. While contract and tort law may seek to balance a
variety of consequentialist and deontological considerations—welfare
maximization, efficiency, fairness, distributive justice, and so on81—
Innovation and Its Discontents (cited in note 4) (same); Bessen and Meurer, Patent
Failure (cited in note 4) (same).
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the objectives of patent law are potentially more straightforward. As I
note above, patent law appears to involve only consequentialist,
economic considerations.82
If courts are particularly adept at
achieving fairness or justice, that may be a reason to continue
delegating contract and tort cases to them irrespective of their
economic shortcomings.
But if those types of deontological
considerations are not present in patent law, the argument for vesting
the power to make rules with a more expert technocratic body is
strengthened.
Finally, institutions other than the judiciary have already
intervened significantly in typical common-law fields.
State
legislatures frequently pass laws governing contracts, torts, and
property.83 A substantial number of states have adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code, a model law drafted by a panel of experts, though
not precisely an administrative agency.84 States have also borrowed
liberally from the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act and other
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similar model codes drafted by expert institutions.85 An even more
extreme example is criminal law, frequently thought of as a commonlaw field but actually dominated by statutes and administrative rules.
Nearly every crime is delineated by a statute.86 In many states those
statutes are based in whole or in part upon the Model Penal Code,
another model statute drafted by a panel of criminal law experts.
Sentencing decisions, long the province of the judiciary, had been
placed largely under the control of administrative sentencing
commissions at both the federal and state levels until the Supreme
Court struck down the arrangement.87 Even so, sentencing statutes
still matter and sentencing guidelines can still be used for guidance.
Patent law is thus striking for the confluence of an
overmatched judiciary and an absent legislature. It has been more than
fifty years since Congress substantially revised the Patent Act, and the
types of patents granted now bear little resemblance to those that
existed in 1952. There are few areas of law, traditional common-law
fields included, that have involved less extra-judicial management in
the past half-century.
II. EXPLAINING THE PTO’S PUZZLING LACK OF AUTHORITY
If judges are ill-equipped to manage patent policy, why has
Congress not delegated substantive rule-making authority to the PTO,
as it has to so many other administrative agencies? Patent law is one
of the few areas of federal law that receives no meaningful input from
an administrative agency. With the exception of the length of the
patent term, a single core issue over which Congress has maintained
authority, Congress has effectively handed full control over the patent
85
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system to the Federal Circuit. Congress has, on occasion, considered
vesting the PTO with the power to make substantive patent rules, but
authorizing legislation has never made it out of either House. In this
Part, I consider several possible explanations. The objective is both
positive and normative. If Congress has refrained from delegating
authority to the PTO for some intelligible reason, that might cast doubt
on the wisdom or likelihood of future action. However, I conclude
that the most likely explanation is the least satisfying one: the PTO’s
lack of authority is likely a historical accident.
A. RENT-SEEKING

It is conceivable that Congress has failed to grant the PTO
substantive rule-making authority due to a desire to continue
collecting rents from interest groups concerned with changes in patent
law.88 On this theory, these interest groups would direct their
lobbying efforts at the PTO if that body possessed substantive
authority, and hence campaign contributions to Congress would
diminish.
This theory seems to have very little general explanatory
power, regardless of context. One could ask why Congress ever
delegates authority, if delegating means sacrificing the opportunity to
collect rents. Equally and oppositely, one could ask why Congress
would be sacrificing any opportunity by delegating if it could simply
threaten to change the law or reclaim power at a moment’s notice.
There is little indication that a theory of rent-seeking could explain
Congress’s pattern of delegation or non-delegation in any set of
contexts, much less this one in particular. The theory is essentially
non-falsifiable.
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Here, moreover, the evidence against the rent-seeking
explanation is even stronger. In the context of patent law, Congress
has evinced comparatively little interest in collecting rents. Congress
adjusts the patent law very rarely—the only significant amendment to
the Patent Act since 1952 was the Hatch-Waxman Act.89 Nor has
Congress shown any particular interest in “rattling the cages” of its
patent constituencies: patent reform bills rarely make it out of
committee. It is thus hard to imagine that Congress has refrained from
granting rulemaking authority to the PTO in order to maximize its
rent-seeking opportunities. Of course, this would not be a normatively
defensible rationale for withholding rule-making power, anyway, even
if it were a descriptively accurate one.
B. PROPERTY RIGHTS

Another potential explanation for congressional inaction is the
nature of the rights that the PTO confers. Congress might believe that
the patent system should be governed by a different set of rules than
other regulatory areas because patents are property rights, and thus
potentially more valuable or harmful than the standard subjects of
regulation.90
Yet there is nothing talismanic about the notion of property.
Whether or not patents are in fact “property” in the traditional sense—
and there is considerable debate on this point91—does not change the
set of rights and entitlements they convey. Patents are alienable,
tradable rights to exclude other parties from making, using, or selling a
particular invention—nothing more and nothing less. In a variety of
other contexts, Congress has delegated authority to administrative
agencies to issue permits or award rights that may be equally valuable
(or equally harmful). For instance, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) issues permits that authorize firms to pollute, and the
FCC awards broadcast licenses to firms that allow them to operate
89
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radio and television stations (to name just two of many possible
examples). These permits are not necessarily property rights or rights
to exclude per se, but they have many of the same effects. They
convey private benefits and (in many cases) negative externalities, and
they offer business advantages to the firms that possess them.92 Under
some conditions these types of permits can be as valuable as formal
property rights to the firms that possess them, and equally socially
wasteful if they are allocated improperly.
Moreover, administrative agencies frequently make rules
governing classical property rights of other types. For instance, in
many localities zoning boards have extensive authority to determine
how private parties may use real property. Environmental laws also
often have substantial effects on property usage.93 It would be
peculiar to argue that zoning boards should be abolished simply
because property rules should never be determined by administrative
agencies. At bottom, there is very little that differentiates regulation
of property (if that is indeed what patents are) from the regulation of
any other area of private behavior. As in any area, the institution
charged with regulating should be the one best positioned to create
productive incentives and minimize externalities and social costs.
There is no reason to believe that the label of “property” is
determinative of which institution that is.
C. STATUTORY VAGUENESS

The Patent Act sets the boundaries of what inventions are
patentable in very general terms. Any “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter” can be patented,
provided that no other inventor has beaten the patentee to the
invention.94 This lack of specificity affords an interpreter a variety of
possibilities for including or excluding various classes of inventions or
discoveries that are not obviously addressed by the plain terms of the
92

In some cases, these permits do function as rights to exclude. For instance, if
pollution is an essential byproduct of a particular business, and if a limited number
of pollution permits are available, a permit to pollute may function effectively as a
right to exclude. Similarly, if there are only a limited number of broadcast licenses
available in a particular market, a broadcast license is effectively a right to exclude.
93
See, for example, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Informational Asymmetries and the
Rights to Exclude, 104 Mich L Rev 1835, 1843 (2006) (describing “zoning laws and
environmental regulations” as typical land use governance mechanisms).
94
35 USC §§ 101 & 102.

REGULATING PATENTS

26

Act itself. Perhaps Congress has shied away from granting substantive
rule-making authority to the PTO because it fears that the agency will
take undue liberties with such a vague statutory grant (and for some
reason this fear is less serious with respect to the Federal Circuit).95
At the outset, it is difficult to understand as a policy matter
why Congress would be reluctant to delegate a broad swath of
authority to an agency (rather than the Federal Circuit) absent some
independent substantive or procedural concern about how the agency
might use that authority. If an agency is superior to a court at
managing smaller regulatory responsibilities, it is not clear why the
agency would not be similarly superior at handling larger
responsibilities. In fact, the broader the grant of authority from
Congress, the more that the exercise of delegated power will resemble
genuine policy-making, as opposed to mere implementation of the
law. The procedural and structural advantages (described below) that
agencies possess in comparison to courts are most significant when
deployed in the formulation of policy, rather than the mere execution
of it.
Moreover, the Patent Act is no broader or less well-defined
than a panoply of administrative statutes under which agencies
currently regulate. For instance, the Occupational Health and Safety
Act instructs the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) to adopt regulations of all potential workplace hazards
“which most adequately assure[], to the extent feasible . . . that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity.”96 The regulations adopted must be “reasonably necessary
or appropriate to provide safe or healthful employment and places of
employment.”97 The Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to regulate
“any air pollutant.”98 And the Endangered Species Act makes it illegal
to “harass [or] harm” any endangered animal.99 Based on this
language the Secretary of the Interior successfully asserted authority to
prohibit modifications to those animals’ habitats.100 The notion that
statutory vagueness could provide a rationale for refusing to delegate
95
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to an agency fails not only as a matter of logic, but as a matter of
historical practice as well.
D. PTO EXPERTISE

A number of scholars have suggested that the PTO cannot be
trusted to employ substantive rule-making authority competently, even
if Congress were to repose it in the agency.101 These scholars point
out that the PTO has been roundly criticized for lackluster
performance of its current task of examining patents. They note as
well that the PTO traditionally has had no policy or economic staff,
though it has recently hired a chief economist.102 By these measures,
the PTO appears far from prepared to assume any sort of meaningful
substantive authority.
But this argument does not account for the fact that the PTO is
a creature of its circumstances. In any administrative agency—indeed,
in any organization—form follows function. The PTO can hardly be
expected to assemble an economic staff if that staff would play no
meaningful role, limited to releasing guidance documents to which the
Federal Circuit would not defer. The PTO operates under conditions
of limited resources; it would be folly for the organization to expend
resources on extraneous staff and activities at the expense of its core
mission of examination. This is not to say that it would be costless for
the PTO to assemble a full policy-making staff and transform itself
into a regulatory entity along the lines of EPA or OSHA. There would
be significant transition costs, among them the hiring of significant
numbers of staff and the restructuring of the office to emphasize the
collection and transmission of information from patent examination.
But this cost should be no greater than the costs borne by any other
administrative agency, costs which hardly hindered their creation.103
Furthermore, the current system supplies the PTO with ample
incentives to deliberately grant too many invalid patents. The PTO is
101

See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104
Mich L Rev 1559, 1575–78 (2004); Arti Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 Colum L Rev 1035, 1132–33
(2003); John R. Thomas, The Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative
Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17 Berkeley Tech L J 727, 742
(2002).
102
See Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office’s
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U Pa L Rev 2051, 2054 (2009).
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See Part III.
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funded entirely by the fees that it generates from examining patents,104
and thus the organization benefits when it can induce private actors to
file for patents in ever-greater numbers. In addition, only applicants
who have been denied patents can ever appeal to the Federal Circuit; if
the PTO grants a patent, the matter is over. Accordingly, the PTO has
an incentive to err on the side of granting too many patents in order to
avoid appeals and reversals.105 Yet these problems are hardly of the
PTO’s own making. It is Congress that sets the agency’s funding, and
Congress that created one-way incentives for the agency to grant
patents. Endowing the PTO with substantive authority would likely
alleviate these shortcomings, not exacerbate them.106
There is little wrong with the patent office as a regulatory body
that time and resources cannot cure.107 The relatively minor
investments necessary provide no rationale for eschewing the
institutional and structural advantages that a regulatory agency could
supply.
E. PTO CAPTURE

Finally, it is possible that Congress has shied away from
granting substantive rulemaking authority to the PTO because of fear
that the agency will be captured by private interests. A number of
scholars have voiced similar concerns, in some cases claiming that the
PTO has already been captured, despite its currently limited role.108
Courts are generally thought to be more resistant to capture,109 and
104

See Rai, 157 U Pa L Rev at 2057 & n 24 (cited in note 102).
See generally Jonathan S. Masur, Patent Inflation (U of Chicago, Public Law
Working Paper No 316, U of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No
529), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1623929 (visited Nov 6, 2010).
106
See Part III.B.1.
107
It is worth noting that the Federal Circuit has failed to develop meaningful
expertise despite being endowed with resources typical to an appellate court since
1982.
108
See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 106–07 (cited in note 4) (arguing that
the PTO is subject to capture); Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51
Wm & Mary L Rev 675, 686 (2009) (same); Long, The PTO and the Market for
Influence, 157 U Pa L Rev at 1984 (cited in note 3) (suggesting that the PTO has
invited capture in order to increase its own stature); R. Polk Wagner, Understanding
Patent Quality Mechanisms 25 (Jan 6, 2009), online at http://
www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/apr17/docs/rwagner2.pdf (visited Nov 13,
2010) (suggesting the influence that repeat players can have on PTO behavior).
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See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 106–07 (cited in note 4).
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Congress might have delegated primary policy-making authority to the
Federal Circuit (rather than the PTO) for this reason.
This is a reasonable argument in favor of trusting courts, rather
than an agency, but it is no stronger in the context of the PTO and
patent law than it is with respect to the EPA and environmental law, or
the Department of Labor and workplace safety law, or any of the other
myriad areas of regulation that have come to be dominated by agency
rulemaking.110 There is no reason to believe that the PTO is
particularly susceptible to capture or likely to cause particular harm if
captured. Indeed, even critics of the PTO have suggested that it may
be less vulnerable to capture than the typical administrative agency.111
At the same time, other scholars have argued that the Federal Circuit
itself may have been captured by private interests.112 As with the issue
of agency expertise, I develop the capture analysis further in Part III.
The foregoing discussion was principally normative, but there
is a related positive possibility that is worth considering. It is entirely
possible that Congress has refrained from delegating substantive
authority to the PTO because of various interest-group forces (or a
lack thereof). It may be that powerful patent interest groups are united
in preferring the status quo to a shift in regulatory authority even
though they disagree about the substantive content of patent law. Or it
may be that Congress has had little incentive to change the law absent
strong private preferences. It is impossible to rule out these
possibilities, though there is no particular evidence in support. But it
is worth noting that they are not normative arguments against vesting
regulatory authority in the PTO. If interest-group dynamics have
prevented Congress from reallocating powers, that might indicate that
any proposal for reform is unlikely to succeed. (I return to this point
in greater detail below.) But it is not a reason for disfavoring that
reform.
F. PATH DEPENDENCE

What then is left to explain the patent office’s puzzling
deficiency of substantive authority? The most likely remaining
possibility is the least satisfying if the objective is crafting sound
110

See Part III.
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patent policy. The fact that Congress has never vested the PTO with
substantive rule-making power may be nothing more than a historical
accident—a path-dependent relic of early American government.
The vast majority of administrative agencies that now possess
regulatory authority were created during the New Deal era or later.
For instance, Congress created the EPA and OSHA in 1970;113 the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) in 1934;114 and the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) in 1930, though it only assumed its modern
form in 1938.115 These agencies were born during the modern era of
technocratic bureaucracy. The rapid growth of the American
economy, coupled with increasing faith in the scientific and policy
judgments of experts, led Congress to assign vast swaths of regulatory
authority to executive-branch agencies as it came to realize that it
could not adequately manage the economy on its own accord.116 The
powers held by these agencies are very much a product of the time
they came into existence.
By contrast, the first Patent Act was passed in 1790,117 and the
Patent and Trademark Office was created in 1836.118 In the much
smaller and economically less complex United States of that period,
regulatory agencies (as we understand them today) were essentially
unknown.119 Congress and the courts were then the major engines of
national policymaking, and an extensive federal common law of
patents has developed in the two centuries since. Accordingly, in the
modern era there has never been a moment at which patent law was in
113

See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub L No 91-596, 84 Stat 1590
(1970); Jack Lewis, The Birth of EPA, EPA J (1985), online at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm (visited Nov 7, 2010). The so-called
EPA Reorganization Plan Number 3, dated July 9, 1970, can be found in the
Congressional Record, Volume 116, H 6523, 91st Congress, 2nd Session.
114
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub L No 73-291, 48 Stat 881 (enacted June 6,
1934), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq.
115
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 USC § 301 et seq.
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See generally Stephen G. Breyer et al, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy
14–29 (Aspen 6th ed 2006).
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Act of April 10, 1790, 1 Stat 109.
A pdf is available online at
http://www.ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Patent_Act_of_1790.pdf
(visited Nov 4, 2010).
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need of wholesale development. Patent law, however flawed it may
be, has always existed in common law form. This is unlike, for
instance, environmental law and food and drug law, which sprang into
existence at the federal level nearly coextensively with the EPA and
FDA, respectively.
Of course, Congress could have later recognized the
inadequacies of the Federal Circuit and redistributed authority to the
PTO. But this type of reallocation of institutional control is extremely
rare. Congress’s creation of the United States Sentencing Commission
may be the only significant instance in which Congress has delegated
power previously held by the judiciary to an administrative agency.120
Where judicially made rules already exist, Congress very rarely
revisits delegations of authority.121 With the federal courts firmly
ensconced as the expositors of patent law, Congress may not have
understood the need for another institutional actor to play a role in the
formation of patent policy.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to conduct a full analysis
of the relationship between regulatory authority and the year an
agency was formed, and the examples proffered here are by no means
conclusive proof of that relationship. But they suggest a strong role
for happenstance and inertia in the institutional assignment of policy
responsibilities, one that may have been determinative in the case of
the PTO. At the same time, this might indicate that Congress is
unlikely to take action in the future if it did not do so in the past. This
is a problem for all proposals for legal reform, and one that I address
below.
120

See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-473 § 212, 98 Stat 1987
(1984).
121
Congress frequently provides existing agencies with additional authority. And on
some occasions Congress will bestow substantive rulemaking power on an agency
that did not previously possess it, but only with respect to newly created federal law.
For instance, in 1991 the Americans with Disabilities Act granted the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission rulemaking authority regarding
discrimination on the basis of disability. See 42 USC § 12117 (West 2011). But it
did not give the EEOC rulemaking authority over previously existing federal law.
Other than the creation of the Sentencing Commission, I have not been able to locate
an instance in which Congress granted an agency power to make rules concerning an
extant body of federal law that had previously been controlled by the courts, but it is
possible that one or more exists. (For that matter, I was also unable to find any area
of law in which Congress has dissolved an agency with substantive rule-making
authority and returned the federal courts to a position of singular authority over the
law.)
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III. ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
In light of the courts’ failings, this Part suggests that Congress
should consider delegating substantive rulemaking authority to the
PTO.122 That is not to suggest that the federal courts would have no
role in patent policy. They would still be involved in overseeing the
PTO’s regulatory actions, adjudicating infringement actions and
appeals from the PTO, and making policy where the PTO has not yet
acted. In short, they would play the same role as the federal courts
currently do in environmental law, securities law, and many other
areas of federal regulation.
The literature on congressional delegation is replete with
analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of courts and agencies as
potential recipients of legal and policy authority.123 Indeed, this
122

I mean to distinguish this from the thoughtful suggestion, offered by some
commentators, that the PTO be afforded Chevron deference when it examines
patents. See, for example, Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of
the APA? What the Patent System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95
Georgetown L J 269, 297–98 (2007); Dreyfuss, 104 Mich L Rev at 1577 (cited in
note 101) (“Congress should expressly instruct courts to afford the PTO the
deference given to federal agencies generally.”). This kind of Chevron deference is
probably a good idea, but it would be largely limited to protecting PTO examination
decisions and according its ad hoc views some modicum of respect. It would not
make the PTO into the primary patent policymaker. Accordingly, it is notable that
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delegating substantive rulemaking power to the PTO. See Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at
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the PTO substantive rulemaking authority.”); Dreyfuss, 104 Mich L Rev at 1577
(cited in note 101) (treating the PTO’s “absence of explicit rulemaking authority” as
fixed). Rai and Dreyfuss’s work is impressive and important, but it does not go as
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Rev 1036 (2006); Frank B. Cross, Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of
Rulemaking, 85 Va L Rev 1243 (1999) (arguing for the complete abandonment of
judicial review of agency rulemaking); Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation
and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 Colum L Rev 452 (1989)
(arguing that judicial deference to agencies is unconstitutional); Cass R. Sunstein,
On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989
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Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U Pa L Rev
549 (1985) (concluding that courts should defer to agencies where Congress has
endowed the agency with significant policymaking responsibility); F. Scott Kieff,
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question encapsulates the Chevron inquiry—to what extent courts
should defer to an agency’s statutory interpretation—and all of its
attendant intellectual baggage.124 Arguments regarding the choice of
institutional actor have coalesced around a finite set of issues:
comparative expertise;125 responsiveness to public opinion;126
procedural advantages;127 and political insulation and susceptibility to
capture.128 However, these various arguments have hardly produced
The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation Over Second-Window Review and
Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the
Trick?, 157 U Penn L Rev 1937, 1943–45 (2009) (cataloguing the strengths and
weaknesses of agencies with particular reference to the patent context).
124
Chevron USA, Inc v Natural Res Def Council, Inc, 467 US 837 (1984). See
generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron from Infancy to
Senescence, 59 Admin L Rev 725 (2007) (analyzing the first prong of the Chevron
test); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 BU L Rev 1271 (2008)
(synthesizing the various Chevron rationales and proposing a new rationale); Cass R.
Sunstein, Law and Administration after Chevron, 90 Colum L Rev 2071 (1990)
(examining the rationale and reach of Chevron); Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 Georgetown L J 833 (2001) (analyzing the scope
of the Chevron doctrine).
125
See, for example, Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference? Implied
Delegations, Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 Admin L
Rev 735, 737 (2002) (arguing that administrative expertise provides the best
rationale for judicial deference to administrative agencies). See also Einer Elhauge,
Preference-Estimating Statutory Default Rules, 102 Colum L Rev 2027, 2135 (2002)
(“The legal realists’ hope that legal ambiguities could be resolved by objective
policy expertise has long ago grown quaint . . . . In practice, it is rare to find a field
of social policy where there are not experts on opposing sides of an issue, . . .
undermining any claim to an objective expert resolution.”).
126
See, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Kevin S. Schwartz, Chevron and
Agency Norm-Entrepreneurship, 115 Yale L J 2623, 2626 (2006) (arguing that
agencies are more democratically accountable than judges); Cass R. Sunstein,
Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power To Say What the Law Is, 115 Yale L J
2580, 2587 (2006) (noting the executive branch's political responsiveness and
accountability); Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion,
54 Geo Wash L Rev 469, 485 (1986) (arguing that agencies are better than courts at
distilling public opinion).
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See, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis,
85 Georgetown L J 2225, 2239 (1997) (noting the superiority of the notice and
comment procedure over judicial decisionmaking procedures); Diver, 133 U Pa L
Rev at 575 (cited in note 123) (noting that agency members are often involved in
creating legislation, and therefore have a better understanding of legislative intent).
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Interpretation, 96 Nw U L Rev 1239, 1276 (2002) (arguing that judicial power is
superior for its political insulation); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the

REGULATING PATENTS

34

agreement. Perhaps the most that can be said is that there are some
circumstances under which delegations to agencies will be superior,
and other under which delegations to courts will produce better
outcomes.
I endeavor here to avoid wading into that analytical mire.
Rather, this Part aims to demonstrate that the affirmative case for
delegating substantive rule-making authority over the law of patents to
the PTO is at least as strong, if not stronger, than the typical case for
administrative delegation; and that the drawbacks to delegating rulemaking authority to the PTO are no more significant, and likely less
so, than in the typical administrative case.
My point is not that the current allocation of powers between
courts, Congress, the President, and federal agencies (other than the
PTO) is ideal. It may be that some agencies should be stripped of their
authority with the power returned to the courts; it may be that agencies
should be afforded even greater power. One can easily name
administrative agencies that most likely should be disbanded
immediately.129 It is well beyond the scope of this article to defend the
status quo fully. Rather, I mean to argue that if one accepts the status
quo as reasonably approximating when delegation is appropriate or
desirable, the case for delegation to the PTO is compelling.
This Part proceeds in two sections. The first section analyzes
the PTO’s capacity to effectively implement substantive regulations
according to standard administrative law metrics. The second section
describes a set of particular advantages that rule-making authority
would provide for the patent system. The patent system faces a unique
set of institutional problems, but the solution lies with a familiar tool
of administrative policy-making.
A. COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE

1. Expertise. That agencies possess greater technical expertise
than courts and are better positioned to address scientifically complex
questions is by now a shibboleth of administrative theory. Judges are
Courts, 72 Chi Kent L Rev 1039, 1054 (1997) (discussing the role of public choice
in deciding between institutional actors).
129
See, for example, Ian Urbina, Inspector General’s Inquiry Faults Regulators, NY
Times
(May
24,
2010),
online
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/25/us/25mms.html (visited Dec 29, 2010)
(describing the failings of the Minerals Management Service).
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legal generalists, unskilled in the policy nuances of the cases that come
before them;130 agencies are staffed by economists and experts in the
substantive field131 who have the benefit of years of education,
training, and experience.132 Moreover, agencies have substantial
budgets with which they can research particular problems in depth,133
while courts must rely upon amicus briefs and the rare appointment of
a special master.134
This is the conventional wisdom, and it holds true for the PTO
as much as for the typical agency. Even low-level employees in the
PTO are experts in their technical fields. Patent examiners are divided
by technical specialty (certain examiners scrutinize only
biotechnology patents, certain work only on semiconductor patents,
and so forth), and each examiner must have at least a bachelor’s

130

See Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in
America 43 (1997) (“[L]egal institutions and procedures for dealing with technical
evidence have remained remarkably static. Most U.S. judges are still generalists,
without any special schooling in the sciences, and practices such as random
assignment of cases prevent judicial specialization in areas requiring technical
knowledge.”); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 Mich L Rev 223 (2008)
(describing the problems that district judges face in performing claim construction).
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and overconfident experts. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119
Harv L Rev 2041, 2058–61 (2006). The point is not that agencies are models for
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extent than courts. I thank Adam Samaha for this point.
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See Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 1069 (cited in note 101) (noting the abundant
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http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2010/assets/summary.pdf (visited Oct 3,
2010).
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See Paul R. Michel, Introduction—The Challenge Ahead: Increasing
Predictability in Federal Circuit Jurisprudence for the New Century, 43 Am U L
Rev 1231, 1244 (1994) (discussing the limited resources of the court); Adrian
Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 Stan L Rev 1569, 1601 (2007) (same);
see also Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 NC L Rev 91, 128 (1993)
(examining the distorted nature of Supreme Court amicus briefs).
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degree in the relevant field.135 In the course of her training and
employment, each examiner also becomes proficient in the details of
patent law. In addition, PTO examiners benefit from the sheer volume
of applications. The typical examiner reviews dozens of patent
applications in a typical year, all falling within the same technological
field.136 Consequently, the examiner is afforded a representative
snapshot of both developments in technology and developments in
patenting practices; the lowly examiner is most likely expert in
contemporary trends in patent writing and prosecuting.137 And these
are merely the lowest rung of employees at the PTO; higher-ups
possess even greater experience.
What the PTO currently lacks are staffs of economists138 who
would be indispensable in formulating broader patent and competition
policy, as well as disposable funds that could be used to conduct
broader research. However, as I noted above, these shortcomings are
endogenous to the fact that the PTO has no need for such staff
members or such resources because it lacks substantive authority over
the law. Were Congress to endow the Patent Office with greater
regulatory power, it would be a comparatively trivial matter for it to
provide it with the funds to hire professional staff and conduct
research at the same moment. Indeed, the PTO has already hired a
chief economist,139 and more staff need not be far behind.
Compare the Federal Circuit. Because it was created as a
specialized court, the Federal Circuit is usually credited with greater
135

See General Requirements Bulletin to the Examination for Admission for
Registration to Practice in Patent Cases before the United States Patent and
Trademark
Office
4–9,
online
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/oed/grb.pdf (visited Nov 4, 2010)
(detailing the degrees or extent of scientific background necessary to sit for the
examination).
136
There
are
6,242
patent
examiners,
see
online
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_28.html
(visited
Nov 7, 2010), and 485,500 patents were filed in 2009, see online at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2009/oai_05_wlt_02.html
(visited
Nov 7, 2010). Each examiner is thus charged with examining approximately 78
patents per year.
137
“Patent prosecution” is the process of applying for a patent and seeing that
application through examination to the granting of the patent. The lawyers who
shepherd patents through PTO examination are known as “patent prosecutors.”
138
See Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 1113 (cited in note 101) (noting that until very
recently the PTO employed no economists).
139
See Rai, 157 U Pa L Rev at 2054 (cited in note 102).
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expertise than the typical judicial body. Judges on the Federal Circuit
are fed a steady diet of patent cases and have ample opportunity to
develop a detailed understanding of patent law, unlike a judge on a
typical circuit who may see one or fewer of many types of cases each
year.
But this regularly accepted perception of expertise is
misleading. The Federal Circuit has great experience with patent
law—not patent policy, much less patent economics. Judges on the
Circuit possess a detailed understanding of the workings of patent
doctrine and the interrelation of various pieces of the patent law,140 but
this is far from equivalent to the ability to design a sensible patent
system that provides the correct incentives for inventors and market
participants. In fact, it is not even clear that the Federal Circuit is
trying. Patent law is now notoriously formalistic141—precisely what
one might expect when a court attempts to establish judicially
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Nevertheless, they manage to err in formulating doctrine at an alarming rate. The
Federal Circuit could not coalesce around a single methodology for interpreting
claims for decades, until Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2005). Even
now does not adhere to its own doctrinal prescriptions. See R. Polk Wagner and Lee
Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Performance, 152 U Pa L Rev 1105, 1179 (2004) (finding that the Federal
Circuit has been only mildly successful in promulgating a coherent and predictable
doctrine of claim construction). The Federal Circuit has also become notorious for
resurrecting old doctrines and applying them in novel, unnecessary ways. See
Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 299–327 (cited in note 11) (describing
this phenomenon with respect to the written description requirement); Mark D. Janis,
On Courts Herding Cats: Contending With the “Written Description" Requirement
(And Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 Wash U J L & Pol 55, 60-61
(2000) (same); Lizardtech, Inc. v Earth Resource Mapping, Inc, 424 F3d 1336 (Fed
Cir 2005) (developing the doctrine). To say that the Federal Circuit is adept even
with patent law doctrine is to afford it the benefit of the doubt.
141
See, for example, Thomas, 52 Am U L Rev at 792 (cited in note 112) (describing
a trend of formalism in five areas of patent law jurisprudence); Timothy R.
Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech L J 1, 1 (2003) (noting that the Federal Circuit has
recently formulated rules to promote predictability and certainty at the expense of
fairness, specifically in the areas of patent claim construction and the doctrine of
equivalents). This formalism may be due in part to the Federal Circuit’s early
reliance on the decisions of one of its predecessor courts, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals. See generally Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law:
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit’s
Jurisprudence, 43 Loy LA L Rev 843 (2010).
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manageable rules in the absence of expertise or agency input.142 Not
surprisingly, many extant doctrines seem significantly flawed from the
perspective of economic theory. And because every patent case must
be appealed to the Federal Circuit, there is no jurisdictional
competition and thus no mechanism that might induce patent doctrine
to evolve in beneficial directions.143
The Federal Circuit suffers from many of the same limitations
as any court. As a group, Federal Circuit judges had insignificant
relevant experience, either with patent law or with the technical
disciplines that surround it, before they were elevated to the court. Of
the twelve active judges on the court, only five of them practiced or
taught patent law before joining the court, only six have even
undergraduate degrees in technical fields, and none has an advanced
degree in economics.144 The court may be “expert” in some limited,
legalistic sense, but that expertise is a poor substitute for genuine
administrative competence. It goes almost without saying that the
district courts and the Supreme Court are no better off.145
In place of true expertise, courts have expert witnesses. The
reliability and usefulness of expert witnesses is of course limited by
the fact that they are paid advocates for a position, not disinterested
observers.146 This disadvantage is exacerbated when the expert
witness must be relied upon to opine on an issue well outside of the
judge’s area of competence. The large-scale economic questions
involved in patent law are precisely those sorts of issues. Determining
whether the benefits of patents on business methods outweigh the
costs, or how stringent the utility requirement should be for gene
142

See Lee, 120 Yale L Rev at 25–30 (cited in note 48); Thomas, 52 Am U L Rev at
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standards); Rai, 103 Colum L Rev at 1115 (cited in note 101132) (noting the
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The Supreme Court can attempt to mitigate its inadequacies by only granting
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mean foregoing any opportunity to pass on issues involving genetics,
pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, or any other innovation at the forefront of modern
technology. Because these types of technology raise particular, and particularly
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patents, will inevitably require extensive empirical analysis.
Promising research is already underway.147 But it is unrealistic to
believe that judges will ever be able to accurately comprehend expert
testimony on these points. As one economically proficient federal
judge put it, “econometrics is such a difficult subject that it is
unrealistic to expect the average judge or juror to be able to understand
all the criticisms of an econometric study, no matter how skillful the
econometrician is in explaining the study to a lay audience.”148
2.
Procedural advantages.
Agencies are commonly
understood to possess a variety of “procedural” advantages over
courts—particularly Article III federal courts—stemming from the
manner in which they may engage with questions of policy. Agencies
can initiate regulatory action when they choose, on the subjects they
select. They need not wait for private parties to bring a case
appropriate for policymaking, as would a court. Notice-and-comment
rulemaking authority also permits agencies to solicit opinions from a
broad spectrum of interested parties, and to test preliminary regulatory
proposals against outside objections.149 Courts, by contrast, must rely
predominantly upon the parties’ and amici’s briefs and reports,
supplemented only occasionally by special masters and outside
experts. Here again the supposedly expert Federal Circuit possesses
no special advantages; it functions like any other federal appellate
court. The tools that accompany typical administrative rulemaking are
thus more adaptable, and more comprehensive, than the typical ad hoc
systems upon which courts are forced to rely. A reformed PTO,
imbued with substantive rule-making authority, would possess this
range of procedural tools.
This discussion illustrates a more general point regarding the
PTO’s procedural capabilities and patent policy. Over the past several
centuries, patent lawmaking has proceeded incrementally, as might be
expected from a common law system.150 This might have been
adequate in some contexts and as applied to some doctrines, but just as
147

See, for example, David S. Abrams, Did TRIPS Spur Innovation? An Analysis of
Patent Duration and Incentives to Innovate, 157 U Pa L Rev 1613 (2009).
148
Posner, 13 J Econ Persp at 96 (cited in note 50).
149
See 5 USC § 553 (2008) (setting forth the procedural requirements for noticeand-comment or “informal” rulemaking).
150
Compare David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U Chi
L Rev 877 (1996) (analyzing the process of common-law rulemaking in
constitutional law).

REGULATING PATENTS

40

surely it must be suboptimal or ill-suited in others.151 It makes little
sense to consign an entire field of law to one mode of development
and reform when others are available.152
3. Political responsiveness and agency capture. The final two
canonical institutional design considerations—an agency’s
responsiveness to public opinion, and the extent to which an agency is
subject to outside “capture” and therefore biased decision-making—
are essentially two sides of the same coin. On the one hand, an
advantage typically ascribed to agencies over courts is the political
nature of the former: their connection to the elected branches of
government.153 If regulation involves political considerations or
tradeoffs, then they are best delegated to an institutional actor, such as
an agency, over which the political branches can exercise authority.154
It is difficult to hold judges accountable if their decisions cease to
serve the public interest. Chevron deference is frequently defended on
these terms.
Because regulatory choices are, at their core,
discretionary matters of policy and politics, silences and ambiguities in
statutes are best read as invitations for agencies, not courts, to make
law.155
At the same time, a court’s insulation from ordinary political
processes and from the actors who might seek to influence it can
151
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provide certain advantages. Like any politically influenced organ of
government, administrative agencies are subject to inducements and
pressures from private outside actors who may have preferences that
diverge widely from the best interests of society at large.156 This
problem can be exacerbated for agencies, which deal repeatedly with
the same industries and often the same firms in the course of
regulating a single field or area of the economy. The fear is that
repeated lobbying, along with the movement of staff members
between the private and public sector, will leave agencies beholden to
the industries they are meant to regulate or inculcated with those
industries’ own preferences and priorities.157
Courts are not entirely immune from capture, however. Judges
operate within an elite legal community and seek reputational benefits
and status within that community,158 and most judges are former
lawyers drawn from that community. Occasionally judges retire and
resume careers as lawyers.159 Conceivably, then, courts are subject to
a similar type of capture by actors within the legal community. This
possibility grows as the size of the relevant community shrinks and the
frequency of judges’ interactions with the same attorneys increases.160
This is the terrain on which the battles over choice of
institutional actor are fought, and thus far these arguments have
neither dissuaded Congress from vesting agencies with tremendous
regulatory power nor convinced proponents of agency capture
theories. On this ground, at least, the PTO fares no worse than the
typical administrative agency. There is no reason to believe that it is
less politically responsive or more subject to capture than the EPA,
FDA, or any other of its peers. On the usual administrative law terms,
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the PTO can make out at minimum a prima facie case for regulatory
authority commensurate with similarly situated agencies.
In fact, however, the case for the PTO is stronger than even
this first-order picture would indicate. Structural features of the
market for patents should render the PTO less susceptible to capture
than many other typical agencies, and better situated vis à vis the
federal courts than most agencies. The regulated community that must
deal with the PTO is larger than for nearly any other administrative
agency. The PTO’s ambit includes every private entity that engages in
any sort of research or development, a larger cohort than the class of
firms that release pollutants (EPA), or produce consumables (FDA), or
engage in collective bargaining (NLRB). Because the PTO interacts
with a broader and more diverse regulated community, it will be more
difficult for any single firm or industry to gain sway over the agency.
Moreover, many parties that interact with the PTO lack strong
interests either for or against stringent patent protection. Most hightechnology firms both hold patents and face competitors with their
own overlapping patent portfolios. Accordingly, it is uncertain
whether these firms would benefit or be harmed if patents were
strengthened or weakened.161 In any event, without decisive lobbying
objectives, these parties should have little interest in even attempting
to capture the PTO.
Of course, as with any agency, there are firms with divergent
private interests before the PTO. In particular, the brand-name
pharmaceutical industry is viewed as the primary modern beneficiary
of powerful patent protection and the industry most likely to invest
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resources in lobbying for greater patent rights.162 There has been
movement toward extending patent rights for drug companies,163 but
those trends are, by and large, neither significant nor contemporary.
The explanation for the pharmaceutical industry’s general failure to
secure most extensive patent rights is likely found in the fact that it is
opposed by powerful interests as well: consumer groups—including
such dominant national organizations as the AARP, which is
concerned about rising prices of drugs for senior citizens—and generic
pharmaceutical companies.164 The presence of these countervailing
forces places the PTO in a situation far different from, for instance, the
EPA. That agency regulates vast numbers of businesses, all of whom
would likely prefer a slackening in regulation, counterbalanced only
by a handful of comparatively weaker environmental groups.165 There
is little reason to suspect that the PTO will have as much difficulty
evading improper outside influence as the canonical administrative
body.
B. THE ADVANTAGES OF PTO INVOLVEMENT

As the previous section argued indicates, there seems little
reason to favor administrative involvement in highly technical
regulatory fields such as environmental and securities law while
simultaneously disfavoring it for patent law. Yet there are advantages
to bestowing substantive rule-making authority upon the PTO that
transcend that meager justification. This section sketches out two of
the most important.
162
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1. Substantive rules and information gathering. One of the
principal goals of any organized system is to ensure that information
flows to the decision-makers most in need of it, or best positioned to
make use of it. Achieving this goal is a matter of bureaucratic
structure and incentives. The parties with the capacity to gather
information must have the proper incentives to invest in obtaining it
and passing it along to the higher-value users, and they must have the
capacity to do so. This problem is difficult enough to solve within a
government bureaucracy that lacks any market pricing mechanism that
could set incentives. But the problem becomes even more difficult
when the institution positioned to gather information and the
institution in need of that information are housed under separate
organizational roofs.
This is the state of play in patent law. The PTO grants nearly
300,000 patents per year, and in doing so accumulates vast amounts of
information on a variety of topics integral to the patent law. To name
just a few examples, the PTO is positioned to learn what the state of
the art is in any given industry, and thus what sorts of inventions
would be truly novel and non-obvious; the level of technical expertise
of a person of ordinary skill in a given field, which is the standard
upon which much of the patent law is based; and the ways in which
patent drafters in various fields employ particular terms of art and
describe particular types of inventions. Yet the PTO cannot make use
of this information directly because it lacks control over the
substantive patent law.
The Federal Circuit, by contrast, sees only a very small fraction
of all patents—it decided fewer than 300 patent cases in 2008,166 for
instance—and nothing approaching a representative sample. In
addition, whereas patent applications come into the PTO’s hands
immediately upon filing, the Federal Circuit typically sees a patent
only years after it was filed. The patent must first wend its way
through the PTO, be allegedly infringed by another party, and then
progress through lengthy litigation at the district court level. This
process takes more than twelve years on average.167 Accordingly, the
Federal Circuit possesses very little information regarding the current
state of technology in any field, and its level of knowledge is
166

This is based on a search of the Westlaw database using the word “patent.” The
results were then culled to remove any cases that did not involve the decision of any
patent-related issue.
167
Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 57 (cited in note 4).

REGULATING PATENTS

45

particularly lacking in the quickly developing technological fields
where it might be most useful.
This lack of information hamstrings the Federal Circuit’s
efforts at formulating sound policy. As an initial matter, the Federal
Circuit undoubtedly makes significant errors when deciding difficult
technical questions. Without a current, ongoing understanding of the
state of a given technological field, the Federal Circuit can hardly be
expected to ascertain how a person of ordinary skill in the art would
understand a patent, or whether that person would have found a
particular invention obvious. And these deficiencies do not touch on
even more complex questions involving the doctrines of utility and
obviousness, for example.
This is not to say that the Federal Circuit has no means of
obtaining information from the patent office. The PTO regularly
produces non-binding Guidelines for its examiners, to which the
Federal Circuit could defer if it so chose. Or the court could simply
solicit information and guidance from the PTO in particular cases or in
the course of formulating particular doctrines. Generally speaking,
however, the Federal Circuit has done neither of these things. It grants
no deference to PTO guidelines, and it does not ask for the PTO’s
advice or guidance. In re Fisher168 is illustrative of this attitude. In
that case, the PTO rejected a patent filing pursuant to its own
Examination Guidelines, and the patentee appealed to the Federal
Circuit. The court eventually upheld the PTO’s decision and validated
the agency’s approach in the Guidelines, but it granted no particular
deference to the patent office—not even weak Skidmore deference,
much less genuine Chevron deference.169 The Federal Circuit treated
the PTO as merely another litigant.
It is worth pausing to note that there is one respect in which
courts would seem better institutionally situated than agencies in this
field. The federal courts adjudicate issues related to both patent
validity and patent infringement, while the PTO encounters only
questions of patent validity.170 This might seem to provide the courts
168
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with at least one informational advantage.171 But again, the PTO’s
singular focus on validity is an artifact of the PTO having never been
delegated any authority over issues of infringement. Moreover, the
issues surrounding infringement—determining when injunctions are
appropriate,172 calculating reasonable royalties,173 etc.—are no less
technically complex than other patent questions.174 If the PTO were
tasked with setting rules to govern infringement, there is similar
reason to believe that it would outperform the courts.175
It is something of a puzzle that the Federal Circuit has not
made better use of the PTO as an informational resource. Why, after
all, should it not avail itself of all available means of improving its
jurisprudence? The answer likely lies with the political economy of
patent law, and in particular the institutional rivalry between the
Federal Circuit and the PTO. The Federal Circuit is, first and
foremost, a patent court. The remainder of its docket is comparatively
insignificant. It was created to function as an expert overseer of the
patent law, and undoubtedly its judges continue to understand their
roles very much in those terms.176 Consequently, the Federal Circuit
171

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the most important infringement doctrines
have direct analogues in doctrines of patent validity: literal infringement parallels
novelty, while the doctrine of equivalents is very similar to obviousness. See
Merges and Duffy, Patent Law and Policy at 781–877 (cited in note 11)
172
35 USC § 283.
173
35 USC § 284.
174
Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 129 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that a
reasonable royalty should be determined by “the profit margin that a company might
expect and the royalty rate common in licenses in that industry”); id at 160
(suggesting that the likelihood of holdup problems should drive decisions regarding
injunctions).
175
It is possible that the PTO should also be granted the authority to hear suits for
patent infringement in the first instance, just as administrative law judges currently
adjudicate regulatory cases across a wide variety of federal agencies (with parties
holding rights of appeal to the federal courts). See The Federal Administrative Law
Judges Conference, FALJC’s Mission, Constitution, and Bylaws, online at
http://005754d.netsolhost.com/faljc1.html (visited Jan 6, 2011). Full consideration
of this possibility is both beyond the scope of this Article and somewhat to the side
of it; the argument here principally concerns which institution will determine
substantive patent law rules, and the PTO need not have adjudicative authority to
fulfill that role. I pause only to note that a shift to agency adjudication is not
inconsistent with the approach advocated here.
176
See The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub L No 97-164, 96 Stat 25
(1982) (codified in various sections of Title 28) (establishing the Federal Circuit);
Harry F. Manbeck Jr., The Federal Circuit—First Ten Years of Patentability
Decisions, 14 Geo Mason U L Rev 499, 499 (1992) (“It was expected that the

REGULATING PATENTS

47

has been loath to cede any authority or even any hint of primacy to the
PTO, its main institutional competitor.177 In addition to refusing to
afford any deference to the PTO’s view of the law, the Federal Circuit
notably declined to review even the PTO’s findings of fact with the
level of deference mandated by the Administrative Procedure Act,178
until the Supreme Court finally forced it to do so.179
For its part, the PTO has little incentive to invest in
information. It has nothing to gain from plying the Federal Circuit
with knowledge that the court will not use. Even if the Federal Circuit
were to make use of the information, it surely would not credit the
PTO with having provided it. Nor can the PTO realize any advantage
by challenging the Federal Circuit directly. Absent intervention from
Congress or the Supreme Court, two parties that rarely engage with the
patent law, the PTO holds no playable cards. The PTO typically
behaves accordingly: nearly all of its guidance documents merely
parrot Federal Circuit caselaw.180 Independent PTO efforts to shape
the law are extremely rare and nearly always unsuccessful. By
consequence, the large quantities of information generated in the PTO
sit uncollected and unutilized.
If the PTO disagrees with the courts as to the appropriate
content of patent law, it is almost certainly best for the patent system
and for society if the PTO simply states (and acts upon) its preferences
directly. This would allow information to reach the public. The PTO
has strong incentives not to pursue this course, however, because to do
so would invite reversal and its attendant costs.181
Accordingly, the PTO might well attempt to accomplish
effectively the same substantive ends through more sub rosa means.
Federal Circuit would provide uniform application and interpretation of the patent
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In particular, the PTO may attempt to use its control over patent
examinations to enforce a de facto substantive law that is opaque and
effectively unreviewable.
Imagine, for example, that the PTO does not believe that
strands of the human genome should be patentable. The patent office
can raise the costs of obtaining a patent on this type of invention in a
variety of ways. It can allocate resources away from the relevant
technological field and reduce the number of working examiners,
causing applications to pile up and lengthening the time it takes for
them to be granted. It can instruct its examiners to search more
diligently for prior art, raising the probability that an application will
be rejected and an inventor will be forced to re-draft claims. And it
can use what little discretionary authority it has in extending deadlines
or granting additional leave to file to discriminate among
These mechanisms will increase the
technological fields.182
transaction costs of getting a patent, and in some cases they may even
serve to block a patent from issuing. Even where the patent eventually
issues and where the transaction costs are insignificant,183 the delay
itself can be extremely costly for a patentee. Delay reduces the
effective length of the patent term because the twenty-year term begins
running when the application is first filed, and it can result in millions
or billions of dollars in lost revenues for patentees.184
These sorts of pathologies are neither unique to the PTO nor
necessarily rare within the administrative state. Nearly any executivebranch organization possessing enforcement power but not lawmaking
power may use its enforcement discretion to affect the de facto content
182

The PTO’s recent efforts to limit the number of continuation applications that a
patentee can file as a matter of right can be understood in this vein. Under the
PTO’s final rules, the office retained discretion to allow parties leave to file
additional continuation applications under certain sets of circumstances. The PTO
may well have envisioned this additional discretion as another mechanism for
selecting among types of technology and fields of potentially patentable subject
matter.
183
See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination at 24–29 J Legal
Analysis (forthcoming 2010), online at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=1105184
(visited Nov 7, 2010) (comparing the low cost of obtaining a patent with the value of
a profitable invention).
184
This is a particularly pressing issue for pharmaceutical companies, which
frequently reap substantial income throughout the life of a patent and depend upon a
lengthy patent term to fund the expensive clinical trials required to bring a patent to
market. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of
Patentability, 87 Tex L Rev 503, 504–05 (2009); see also note 162.

REGULATING PATENTS

49

of the substantive law. This phenomenon has been observed most
notably in the criminal law,185 and it may exist in a variety of other
legal fields as well.186 Yet its operation in patent law is different for
one important reason: unlike other fields of law, there is no explicit
element of discretion vested in the PTO. Unlike any prosecutor, the
PTO must accept every filed application and is obligated to grant
every patent that is valid under the Patent Act. The PTO is expected
to function, ideally, as an automaton. Accordingly, the PTO possesses
no official policymaking space; there is no sense in which the patent
office’s ability to promote or delay certain applications could be
understood or justified as a purposeful, systemic means of agendasetting. When the PTO subverts the Federal Circuit’s intentions
regarding the patent law, it is acting beyond the contemplated
boundaries of the patent system.
By contrast, a PTO imbued with the authority to make
substantive legal rules would possess both the ability and the incentive
to draw upon the information it is positioned to gather. The PTO
could collect information from both outsiders and its own examiners.
It could conduct studies analyzing the types of patents filed and the
state of the art in various technological fields. And it could even enlist
economists in performing larger-scale studies to determine the
economic value of particular doctrines.
Importantly, these PTO policy innovations would be
substantially resistant to Federal Circuit intervention. If the PTO were
to employ notice-and-comment rulemaking, like any other similarly
situated administrative agency it would be entitled to Chevron
deference in its interpretations of the Patent Act. Because the Act is
phrased in such general, ambiguous terms,187 in most cases this
deference should be decisive. This is not to say that the Federal
Circuit would have no oversight role; PTO regulations would still
undergo arbitrary and capricious review in the Circuit. But for the
most part the PTO would be able to implement policy without fear of
185
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being summarily overturned by the Federal Circuit. Accordingly, the
PTO would have the proper motivation to challenge the Federal
Circuit where appropriate.
2. Particularized patent advantages. Armed with this
information, the PTO could conceivably adjust a variety of patent
doctrines with greater precision than an inexpert court can achieve.
Patent law differs importantly from other legal fields because of the
scope and specificity of the technologies involved. One case may
require detailed scrutiny of semiconductor designs; another may
demand an analysis of gene sequencing. In response to this great
variety of technological issues, and because they are not skilled in the
relevant technologies, patent law has officially embraced a doctrine of
technological neutrality: patent doctrines should not differentiate
between technologies. Accordingly, courts have constructed a number
of general rules that operate across technological fields.188
Yet this is despite the fact that there is little reason to believe
that all fields should be treated equivalently. Moreover, each new
patent case demands that the courts reapply this general standard to the
relevant technology, which is a difficult and time-consuming exercise.
Some scholars believe that the courts have already attempted to design
field-specific patent rules, though frequently without success.189 The
PTO could improve upon these doctrines by drafting technologyspecific rules that more accurately reflect the state of the art and
reduce the decision costs of courts that must comb through the
technologies. This section highlights three particular areas in which
PTO rulemaking could lead to marked improvements.
First, consider the role of the “person having ordinary skill in
the art” (the “PHOSITA”) in patent law. Much like the “reasonable
person” in tort law, the PHOSITA is a construct used to define a
variety of patent doctrines. An invention is obvious if a PHOSITA
would find it obvious;190 a patent sufficiently enables the underlying
invention (per section 112 of the Patent Act) if it would teach a
PHOSITA how to create the invention.191 The PHOSITA allows
courts to decide patent cases without assembling any systematic
188
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understanding of the state the art in any technological field—they need
only decide what a PHOSITA would have understood regarding the
technology at issue.192 A consequence of this approach is that no case
creates meaningful precedent regarding skill in the art. Courts’
conclusions as to how a given PHOSITA would treat a particular
technology are of essentially no use beyond the four corners of the
opinions in which they are issued. Far preferable would be particular
legal findings regarding the state of the art or the level of available
knowledge in a given field, findings that could govern future cases and
allow private parties to adjust their patenting behavior accordingly.
For reasons likely related to its lack of information, the Federal Circuit
has shied away from this course.
By contrast, the PTO could employ the expertise of its
examiners directly to determine the level of ability and knowledge of a
person having ordinary skill in the art in any number of technical
fields. It could then incorporate this information into a set of
regulations, updated regularly, which would then govern the many
PHOSITA-related questions arising in patent cases in those fields.193
Note that the PTO already is forced to ascertain the level of skill of the
PHOSITA in the course of assessing essentially every patent
application for obviousness. It seems absurd to waste the enormous
amounts of information generated through this process, rather than
standardizing it and applying it to both examinations and court cases.
Moreover, a consistently updated set of regulations would create a
permanent record of the changing level of skill in the art over time.
Courts could draw upon this database when adjudicating infringement
actions that arise years after a patent has issued, rather than having to
rely upon experts and guesswork to ascertain the appropriate level of
skill in the art in a bygone era.
Second, the PTO could set forth a set of rules for construing
patent claims. These rules could take into account the specifications,
prosecution history, and available extrinsic evidence based on the
192

It is worth noting that the PHOSITA must be defined not just by technological
field but by time: a person with ordinary skill in the art would know more about
computers in 2010 than in 1960.
193
If this seems too rigid, these regulations could be structured instead as rebuttable
presumptions. The PHOSITA would be presumed to have the knowledge and skill
embodied in the relevant PTO regulation unless a litigant demonstrated otherwise
with expert testimony. The PTO could even select the proper evidentiary standard: a
preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or something in
between.
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PTO’s broad-based knowledge, acquired in the course of examining
hundreds of thousands of patents, regarding how patent drafters
commonly employ language and structure. The Federal Circuit’s
efforts in this area have been halting and uncertain. Current law is
little more than an admonition to consider each factor in turn, and to
an unspecified extent.194 Not surprisingly, the Federal Circuit’s
jurisprudence is viewed as largely unsuccessful.195 The rate of
reversal of district court opinions is very high, and district court judges
do not appear to improve with experience.196 It would not be difficult
for the PTO to improve upon this record.
Third, at the outer reaches of possibility, a properly
empowered patent office could consider varying the length of the
patent term among different industries.197 It is entirely likely that the
standard twenty-year term is inappropriate for all patents in all fields;
it persists in part because Congress and the courts lack the resources
and skill necessary to adjust it. The PTO could combine the expertise
of its examiners in understanding how research is conducted in various
fields with the analysis of economists to determine whether deviations
194

See Phillips v AWH Corp, 415 F3d 1303, 1314–18 (Fed Cir 2005) (en banc)
(explaining that district court judges should consider the language of the claims
themselves, the specifications, the prosecution history, and also extrinsic evidence
when construing patent claims).
195
See Wagner and Petherbridge, 152 U Pa L Rev (cited in note 140) (illustrating the
failings of Federal Circuit claim construction doctrine and the Federal Circuit’s own
treatment of that doctrine).
196
See Schwartz, 107 Mich L Rev (cited in note 130) (noting the low rate at which
the Federal Circuit affirms claim construction judgments and the fact that district
judges do not appear to improve their success rates with experience). This is not
even to speak of the mind-bending contradictions inherent to Federal Circuit
doctrine, such as the mutually contradictory notions that claims “must be read in
view of the specification, of which they are a part,” Markman, 52 F3d at 978, on the
one hand, and that the courts “should not import limitations from the specifications
into the claims.” ICU Medical, Inc v Alaris Medical Systems, Inc, 558 F3d 1368,
1375 (Fed Cir 2009). Not to mention the fact that the written description
requirement demands that the specification “describe the manner and process of
making and using . . . the full scope of the invention,” Lizardtech, Inc v Earth
Resources Mapping, Inc, 424 F3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed Cir 2005), which also seems
inconsistent with the admonition against reading limitations from the specification
into the claims.
197
This might run afoul of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) and might thus be unworkable absent an internationally
negotiated amendment to that treaty. See Burk and Lemley, The Patent Crisis at 20
(cited in note 4). It is in that sense in particular that this option is especially farfetched.
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from the standard term are warranted. And the PTO, unlike any other
institutional actor, already has experience in sorting patents into
categories based on technical field: It classifies newly-filed
applications according to type of technology in order to assign them to
the proper examiners.
C. PROSPECTS FOR REFORM

Irrespective of the wisdom of delegating substantive
rulemaking authority to the PTO, it might appear unlikely that
Congress will act simply because it has not done so thus far. The very
fact that the allocation of institutional authority remains unchanged,
despite the Federal Circuit’s documented failings, might be taken as
evidence that Congress will not alter it in the future. In addition, if
Congress does grant the PTO rulemaking authority and the agency
misuses that power, it might be advisable for Congress to strip the
PTO of authority and return to the status quo ante. Yet if it is difficult
to persuade Congress to make one change, it might be impossible to
convince it to make a second.
This is a type of objection that might be raised against any
proposal for legislative reform—if the idea is so beneficial, why has
Congress not acted upon it already? But it is strengthened somewhat
in the context of patent law, where Congress has not enacted any
significant legal change in more than fifty years. It is possible that a
powerful coalition of patent interest groups favor the status quo, or
that interest in legal change is simply too minimal to spur
congressional action.198 This may also be a particularly difficult type
of reform to enact. As I note above, Congress very rarely (if ever)
grants an agency authority to make rules concerning a judge-made
body of law.199
At the same time, there has never been any serious attempt to
transfer substantive rule-making authority to the PTO or any strong
advocate for such a move. It may simply be an idea whose time has
not yet arrived. A transfer of institutional authority also involves
different political dynamics than a substantive change in the law. It is
clearer who the winners and losers will be from a substantive change
than from a reallocation of decisional authority, and thus perhaps
easier to reallocate authority when private parties have entrenched
198
199

See Part II.E.
See Part II.F.
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interests. Congress is also likelier to grant power to an agency when it
is uncertain as to the proper policy course.200 If Congress is
dissatisfied with the Federal Circuit but lacks the information
necessary to make sound substantive patent judgments, it might turn
instead to the PTO.
In the end, it may well be that the prospects for institutional
change are slim. But given the failings of the current system, there is
no reason not to try.
CONCLUSION
For years, federal judges have decided patent cases pursuant to
doctrine and precedent without any clear indication regarding the
wisdom of the policies they were attempting to promote. The result is
a set of patent rules that in many contexts appears broken. Yet the
courts can hardly be blamed for the mess; they were never meant to
manage policy in an area as fraught with technological and economic
complexity as patent law.
Bilski lays bare this fundamental
institutional weakness. Faced with a crucial issue of patentability that
might affect the shape of several major areas of economic activity, the
Supreme Court had no choice but to fall back upon doctrine and
precedent, legal tools that have proven entirely inadequate to the task
at hand. For its part, Congress has played no meaningful role in
managing the patent system for more than half a century.
Because the courts have appeared incapable—and the
legislature uninterested—it is time to consider other institutional
arrangements. Rather than continuing to rely upon the federal courts
to fumble towards a workable patent policy, Congress should
authorize the Patent and Trademark Office to make rules with the
force of law. The case for vesting substantive regulatory authority in
the PTO is perhaps even stronger than for the typical administrative
agency. Unlike the Federal Circuit, the PTO would be able to muster
resources and expertise in addressing the crucial economic and
technical issues that underlay patent law. The PTO could even
innovate further, creating field-specific rules of patent scope,
interpretation, or even duration. There is no principled justification for
200

See generally David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers: A
Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers 34–
38 (Cambridge 1999) (describing Congress as facing a decision whether to “make”
policy through substantive legislation or “buy” it through delegation).
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the arrangement that has left patent law governed by the courts while
other similarly technical areas such as environmental law or securities
law are run by agencies. It is merely a historical accident—and one
that Congress should rectify.
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